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World food markets into the 21st century:
commodity risk management policies
{
Ron Duncan*
Recent concerns about future global food production seem poorly based. The rapid
phase of growth in food consumption is over for most of the world's population
because of increased incomes and, besides, population growth rates continue to
slow. Thus, the rate of growth of food production needed in the future is much
lower than it has been for the past 40 years. Production and price instability will
continue, perhaps with lessened intensity because of reduced government
intervention. With private agricultural interests now facing greater exposure to
price and production risks, especially in developing countries, there needs to be
greater emphasis on ¢nancial market instruments for managing these risks.
1. Introduction
Questions about the ability of the world to feed its growing human
population become very topical from time to time. Such apprehension
usually intensi¢es following a sharp run-up in prices of major foodstu¡s as
happened after the sharp grains price increases in 1973^74. In recent years
there has been a drumbeat of concern raised by those with mainly
environmental worries about depletion and degradation of soils and water
supplies. In the past year these anxieties have been reinforced by the
publication of Lester Brown's (Brown 1995) gloomy forecasts of grain
consumption and production in China and by the sharp increase in grain
prices in the year to June 1996.
Pessimistic forecasts about the adequacy of food supplies made in the past
have subsequently turned out to be wrong. Is there any reason to believe that
recent forecasts of long-term crises in food supplies should have greater
credibility? In this article I describe the performance of world food
production, primarily grain production, over the past 40 years or so. I also
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important changes in demand which many commentators ignore in making
forecasts of the world food outlook. I present the prospects for world food
production as seen by the major agencies undertaking outlook work,
compare their forecasts and discuss reasons for any di¡erences.
I then discuss which post-Uruguay Round developments may pose the
greatest threat to instability in world food markets and the situations in
which such instability will pose problems. I also discuss how such instability
may best be managed.
2. The past 40 years' performance in food production
Despite periodic concern about the world's ability to feed itself, it has in fact
been feeding itself at ever-improving levels and at lower real prices ^ even
with a much larger population. World output of cereals, the main food
source for the majority of consumers, has increased by 2.7 per cent per year
since 1950 while population has grown by about 1.9 per cent per year, i.e.,
almost a 1 per cent per year per person increase. Cereal yields alone have
increased more rapidly than world population since 1950 ^ at 2.25 per cent
per year. This increased production has allowed per person calorie
consumption in developing countries to increase by about 27 per cent since
the early 1960s. These facts do not mean that all people have adequate diets,
but diets for most of the people in developing countries in aggregate have
improved substantially.
This picture is very di¡erent from what was often forecast. Paul Ehrlich
in 1968 was very pessimistic about the world food situation.
Americans are beginning to realise that the undeveloped countries of
the world face an inevitable population-food crisis. Each year food
production in undeveloped countries falls a bit further behind burgeoning
population growth, and people go to bed a little bit hungrier. While there
are temporary or local reversals of this trend, it now seems inevitable
that it will continue to its logical conclusion: mass starvation. (Ehrlich
1968:17)
Ehrlich's understanding of what was happening in the 1960s was wrong
and 30 years later what he thought he saw happening or forecast still has not
happened. In fact, the global food situation has continued to improve.
The FAO's food production index estimates that in industrial countries
there was a 28.9 per cent increase in per person food production from 1961
to 1991 and a 19.3 per cent increase for developing countries. Within
developing country regions, Asia experienced the largest increase (33.3 per
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Sub-Saharan Africa is the main exception to these developments with many
African countries experiencing stagnant or even declining per person
production. Population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has been
about 3 per cent per year while food production has grown by 2 per cent per
year. The problems there as with most cases of a worsening food situation
are mostly to be blamed on bad government policies rather than the
inadequacies of the natural resources. In Sub-Saharan countries there is a
strong correlation between the proportion of the world price of crops
received by farmers and productivity growth.
Within the populous Asian region, performances have been extraordinary.
China increased per person food production by 66.8 per cent in the
1961^91 period. This was due to rapid increases in aggregate food
production and population growth of only 1.8 per cent per year. Indonesia
experienced an increase of 67.7 per cent in per person food production, even
though its population grew at a reasonably rapid 2.3 per cent per year.
Brazil, with the largest population in Latin America (147 million in 1990),
increased per person food production by 70.4 per cent over the 1961^91
period. The increasing proportion of better-fed people in the world is largely
due to the gains made in Asia, however. Approximately 60 per cent of the
world's population is Asian. Africa, which had the poorest performance,
accounts for only about 12 per cent of the world's population.
While a larger and larger proportion of the world's population has been
experiencing improved diets, food prices have been declining in real terms.
The World Bank's index of food commodity prices fell by 78 per cent from
1950 to 1993 in constant dollar terms. Moreover, food prices have fallen as
the ability of people in developing countries to purchase food has increased.
From 1960 to 1990, real per person GDP of developing countries increased
by an average of 162 per cent. East Asian developing countries experienced
the most rapid increases in per person incomes. This has meant signi¢cantly
reduced food costs in relative terms.
3. Trends in consumption
While most commentators focus on what has happened or what might
happen to food production, they ignore the important changes taking place
on the demand side. Further, it is likely that demand-side changes are going
to be the most important for the future world food situation. During the
1980s, world cereals consumption growth slowed to 1.7 per cent per year
from the 2.7 per cent increase averaged in the 1970s. In part, the slowdown
was due to the slower economic growth in many developing countries during
this di¤cult period; however, consumption growth also slowed in many
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period. In China, for example, real GDP grew substantially faster during the
1980s than during the 1970s, yet consumption of cereals grew by an average
of 2.3 per cent per year during the 1980s compared to 5.2 per cent per year
during the 1970s. This pattern of change holds some very important
lessons.
Behind this slowdown are two factors: ¢rst, the stage of most rapid
increase in total food demand for most of the world's population is past. Per
person consumption in total volume terms has risen to levels which are
adequate for most consumers. This has been achieved because of the rapid
increases in per person incomes in developing countries over the past two
decades. The world's average per person cereals consumption has not
increased appreciably since 1978, and in developing countries the average
has not increased since 1982. Shifts from cereals consumption to other foods
such as meats, vegetables and fruits will continue but the decline in the rate
of growth of total food demand is expected to continue. This expectation is
reinforced by the second factor responsible for the declining consumption
growth rate, which is the declining rate of population growth.
The fast rates of population growth that we have seen in recent decades
in developing countries are in many cases the result of what is known as the
demographic transition. Clean water and better sanitation have reduced the
impact of infectious diseases around the world, reducing rates of infant
mortality and increasing life expectancy at birth. But it takes some time for
the fertility rate of families to adjust to the new situation. So, for a period
the population growth rate increases sharply. The faster the income growth
of a country, however, the faster the fertility rate adjusts. Those developing
countries which have had rapid per person income growth in recent decades
have gone through the demographic transition and now have much lower
population growth rates. The best solution for the rapid population growth
still being experienced in many countries is for them to adopt policies leading
to faster economic growth.
As a result of the changes in world food demand, challenges to the world
food situation have changed considerably. Now that most consumers have
adequate quantities of food, they are demanding greater variety. Consumers
who a decade ago consumed most of their cereals as rice or maize now
demand wheat products such as bread and noodles as well as more meat,
fruits and vegetables. While in developing countries the emphasis is on
consumption of more meats and vegetable oils, in industrial countries the
dietary emphasis is on less red meats and more fruits and vegetables. The
challenge, therefore, is for agricultural policies to adjust to these changes.
Whereas, policy may have favoured the basic staple such as rice through
price policies, irrigation policies and research and extension, the focus has to
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good example. A case can be made that the Green Revolution in rice was a
response to the rapid income growth of the Asian rice-dependent economies.
The world does not now need rice production to grow nearly as fast as it
once did. More research emphasis now needs to be given to yield increases in
wheat and grain and oilseeds for livestock feeds, as well as to improving
livestock yields.
During the 1960s and 1970s, population growth accounted for one-half
of the increase in total cereals consumption in developing countries and two-
thirds of the increase in industrial countries. With the declining impact of
income growth on total food demand in developing countries, and as more
countries move beyond the fast phase of food demand increase due to rapid
per person income growth, the impact of population growth will become
relatively greater. But this impact will lessen with the declining population
growth. World population growth appears to have peaked at 2.1 per cent per
year in the 1965^70 period and declined since to 1.7 per cent per year (United
Nations 1993). Further decline is expected with further declines in fertility
rates and slower declines in death rates so that the world population growth
rate could be 1.4 per cent or lower by 2020. This rate assumes a developing
countries' population growth of 1.7 per cent per year, with the Sub-Saharan
growth rate near 3 per cent per year. But if economic growth rates improve
on the African continent and in countries in South Asia still with high
population growth rates, the population growth rate for developing countries
could well be lower.
4. Global food projections
Food production, consumption, price and trade projections are inherently
uncertain. However, there are distinguishable short-term and long-term
uncertainties. Short-term £uctuations in prices and production ^ due mostly
to weather £uctuations and disease outbreaks ^ give rise to most concern
among the general public and generate most public policy response. It is the
long-term uncertainties about yield growth (or more generally the pay-o¡
to agricultural research), changes in the resource base (soils, water supplies),
income growth rates and population growth rates, as well as agricultural
policies which are most relevant to the world food situation over the long
term. To take all the various factors involved into account, it is necessary to
assess the global food outlook within a multi-market framework which
prevents inconsistencies in assumptions about the many variables involved.
Such a framework also allows a more disciplined approach to tests of
di¡ering assumptions about the future course of the important factors.
Sets of projections of the world cereals situation, derived from global
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a long-term background of analysis of primary commodity markets. These
are the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO),
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World
Bank. Long-term outlooks from the three organisations are presented in
Islam (1995), by Mitchell and Ingco (1995) from the World Bank,
Alexandratos (1995) from the FAO and Agcaoili and Rosegrant (1995) from
IFPRI. IFPRI projections are also presented in Rosegrant et al. (1995).
Mitchell and Ingco's projections are presented in greater detail in Mitchell,
Ingco and Duncan (1997). The results of the three projection exercises are
also compared in Islam (1995). These projections incorporate best guesses
about future paths for incomes, populations and yields and do sensitivity
tests on these variables as well as on other critical variables such as fertiliser
prices and investment rates.
Generally, the projections to year 2010 are very much in agreement (see
table 1). World cereal production and consumption are projected to grow by
Table 1 Comparison of results of global cereals projections to 2010











Actual 1989^91 1726.5 266.0 579.8 202.8 326.8 862.7
Projected to 2010
Alexandratos 2334.0 (1.5)
b 306.0 (0.5) 710.0 (1.1) 292.0 (1.8) 473.0 (2.0) 1318.0 (2.1)
Agcaoili and
Rosegrant
2405.0 (1.7) 389.0 (1.5) 785.0 (1.3) 297.0 (2.2) 426.0 (1.6) 1232.0 (1.9)
Mitchell and
Ingco
2311.0 (1.5) 324.0 (0.2) 733.0 (1.0) 282.0 (1.6) 475.0 (1.6) 1253.0 (1.8)
Net trade
Actual 1989^91 ÿ37.2 129.7 ÿ3.2 ÿ14.7 ÿ88.8
Projected to 2010
Alexandratos 5.0 157.0 ÿ10.0 ÿ15.0 ÿ162.0
Agcaoili and
Rosegrant
8.0 151.0 ÿ10.0 ÿ14.0 ÿ161.0
Mitchell and
Ingco
15.0 195.0 ÿ31.0 ÿ22.0 ÿ210.0
Source: Islam (1995).
Notes:
a In Mitchell and Ingco's study, Taiwan is separated from China and is included in other East
Asia and Paci¢c countries. In the other two studies Taiwan is included with China. Taiwan's
data for 1989^91 was: production 1.9 million tons, total use 8.1 million tons, and imports 6.1
million tons.
b Figures in parentheses are rates of growth from 1989^91 to 2010.
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production of cereals grew by 2.7 per cent on average over the 1970^80
period and by 1.6 per cent in the 1980^91 period. Industrial country
production is expected to grow by 1.0 to 1.3 per cent per year over the
projection period. By comparison, production in these countries increased by
2.9 per cent in the 1970^80 period and by 0.2 per cent in the 1980^91 period.
The main reason for the decline in the 1980s was that in response to the high
level of world grain stocks, the 1985 US Farm Bill sharply reduced support
prices to agriculture and reduced US cropland planted to grains by 19 per
cent in the 1985^87 period. Lester Brown (1991) misinterpreted the impact of
the US policy to argue that world production of grain was no longer
increasing.
In the developing countries, cereals production rose by 3.1 per cent per
year in the 1970^80 period and by 2.7 per cent per year in the 1980^91
period. The forecasters project a rate of growth in the period to 2010 of
between 1.8 and 2.1 per cent. Remember that population growth in
developing countries is projected at 1.7 per cent or even less by this time. As
table 1 shows, the industrial countries (such as Australia, Canada, France,
and the United States) have provided the exports needed by the former
centrally planned economies and the developing countries. Their role as
exporters is expected to grow in importance to supply projected developing
country imports of 160^210 million tons by 2010. At the same time, the
forecasters expect the former centrally planned economies to shift from being
major importers to being signi¢cant exporters. What happens in the former
centrally planned economies will be one of the most important factors
a¡ecting the long-term world food situation and one of the most uncertain.
Two factors strongly support such projections, however. First, cereal
consumption in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central
European economies was heavily subsidised, to the extent that total per
person calorie consumption was higher than in the richest industrial
countries. With the movement towards world market prices in these
countries, per person consumption of cereals has declined and wastage in
consumption will be reduced. Second, while several of these economies have
resource endowments favouring agricultural production, their agricultural
production, harvesting and storage practices under central planning were
highly ine¤cient. With the shift to market pricing, e¤ciency should improve.
Yields, including livestock feeding ratios, should increase more quickly (see
Tyers 1994 for a comprehensive discussion). How fast these improvements
will take place will depend greatly on how quickly secure property rights to
land and pro¢t can be established. The bene¢cial impact of giving more
secure property rights to land to farmers in China and Vietnam should carry
a strong message to countries such as the Russian Federation.
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Rosegrant (1995) is basically due to their more optimistic projection for the
former centrally planned economies ^ 1.5 per cent growth compared to 0.5
per cent growth projected by Alexandratos (1995) and 0.2 per cent projected
by Mitchell and Ingco (1995). But all analysts would acknowledge the high
degree of uncertainty attached to this projection, which £ows over into the
net trade projection.
There is substantial agreement between the projections on the outlook
for China. None of the projections give any support to the very pessimistic
forecasts made by Brown (1995). Mitchell and Ingco project net imports of
22 million tons by 2010, while Alexandratos and Agcaoili and Rosegrant see
no increase in cereals imports over the 1989^91 level. Brown's arguments
supporting his projection of China's cereals imports of up to 370 million tons
by 2030 have been e¡ectively discredited by various writers recently (e.g.,
Alexandratos 1996; Johnson 1997). I therefore give them no credence in
discussing the likely sources of risk in food markets.
5. Uncertainty and instability in world food markets
I discuss the world food outlook in terms of the main areas of uncertainty
which will have an important bearing on how much continued improvement
in the world food situation we will see and, separately, the issue of instability
in world food markets and what courses of action to adopt with respect to
such instability.
As I have argued above, developing countries have been experiencing
rapid population growth. But these growth rates have slowed as countries
have moved through the demographic transition, particularly those countries
experiencing sustained, rapid economic growth. Global population growth
is moving to a much reduced level; the reduction will be even greater if
sustained economic growth can be achieved in South Asia and Africa.
Therefore, the yield increases needed to maintain increases in per person
food consumption will not be as large as in recent decades.
Even allowing for increases in incomes in developing and transition
economies, the best estimates of the yield growth needed for the next one to
two decades are in the range 1.5 to 1.7 per cent per year ^ allowing for no
increase in farmed area. Cereal yields have averaged 2.25 per cent annually
since 1950. A pessimistic view is that this rate of yield growth, due in large
part to the introduction of semidwar¢ng genes into rice and wheat, was
fortuitous and may well not be repeated. In that case, we would have to
manage with traditional rates of breeding progress in the range of 0.5 to 1.0
per cent per year (Fischer 1996). This is an extremely pessimistic view, given
the performance of science in the twentieth century. Moreover, closure of
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transition countries should be greatly enhanced by better agricultural
institutions and policies ^ particularly more secure property rights to land,
lower taxation of agriculture, and freeing up of markets, particularly for
fertiliser.
Institutions and policies also have a large role to play in improving the
agricultural resource base. Concerns about degradation of water, soil and
germplasm resources are legitimate. In most cases, the most appropriate
management of these resources will be achieved by institutional developments
which internalise the external costs associated with their use. This may well
mean that marginal lands will no longer be farmed or not farmed as
intensively, or that water will be priced appropriately and its agricultural use
reduced. Farmers should not be encouraged into extra-marginal land uses by
policies as, for example, in Australia where drought areas are declared with
great frequency and incomes are subsidised as a result. Such action pretends
that the Australian environment is something other than what it actually is.
While these desirable developments in institutions and policies may well
reduce the physical agricultural resource base in some cases, overall resource
allocation and social welfare will be improved. But I believe that the impact of
any such reductions on farming output will be more than o¡set by the
improved e¤ciency coming from institutional developments which give
farmers more secure access to land and water.
The issues discussed above have dealt with their impact on the long-term
world food outlook. But some of these issues also a¡ect the stability of food
markets. For example, reducing government subsidies of marginal land use
in Australia would reduce the instability of farm production. In a global
context, such policy action would have a bene¢cial impact on price stability.
More secure access to land leads to greater investment in land, including
investment promoting soil and water conservation, which leads to less
instability in production.
Production instability may also be reduced by the liberalisation of
agricultural markets, though there has been little reduction of protection of
agriculture to date through multilateral processes (see e.g., Hathaway and
Ingco 1995). This result is particularly disappointing with respect to the
United States and the European Union whose farm policies have had the
most destabilising impacts on world agricultural markets, as happened in the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. While most world market instability arises from
weather shocks in large producing countries, on occasion the instability has
been attenuated by policy measures in large producing countries such as the
United States. But other countries are becoming large in international terms
such that the actions they take to a¡ect production and/or stock levels can
have a signi¢cant impact on world prices through changes in their net trade.
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wool markets. It may become a major player in the grains and oilseeds
markets. Indonesia is now a large participant in the rice market.
Unfortunately, periods of rapid growth of imports which accompany
sustained fast income growth in developing countries trigger pressures for
poor policy choices. As per person incomes are increasing from very low
levels, food consumption increases rapidly. Domestic food production is
unable to keep up with the rapid consumption growth, which may be as high
as 6^8 per cent per year, and imports have to increase. However, there is
often political pressure to restrict imports. It is not realistic to expect
domestic agricultural production to achieve such growth rates. But this
period of rapid consumption growth and high import demand growth passes
as per person incomes continue to increase. Adopting policies which attempt
to maintain self-su¤ciency during this phase of economic development
would be economically very costly. China is one of the more recent examples
of countries going through this process. Because of its continuing high
income growth and sharp reduction in population growth rate, it should pass
through this phase relatively quickly. But there are considerable pressures
from within the country, fostered by the kinds of uninformed projections
made by Brown (1995), for policies to maintain self-su¤ciency in grains. Not
only would adopting self-su¤ciency policies have an adverse impact on
economic development within China, it would rob grain-exporting countries
such as Australia of major export opportunities.
The opportunities for bad policy choices, therefore, remain large, and this
together with production shocks stemming from natural causes should
ensure continuing commodity market instability. Whether production- or
policy-related price shocks will be as frequent or of the same magnitude as in
the past, it is impossible to say. Primary commodities di¡er greatly in the
degree of price instability, which appears to be related more to the price
formation processes of the individual markets than to characteristics such as
the share of total production traded or the inelasticity of demand or supply.
It may be argued that production shocks could become more frequent or of
greater intensity as farming presses harder against the margins of soil
quality, water availability or the germplasm resource. I believe, however,
that adoption of good policies and institutions can lead to an even more
robust farming system.
6. Management of commodity risks
Production and price instability will persist as will no doubt the debate over
the nature of government involvement in its management. As Timmer
(1996) summarised the current status of the debate: `The mainstream
438 R. Duncan
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997academic literature has judged schemes to stabilise food prices as extremely
di¤cult to implement, not worth the costs, and highly likely to be captured
by special interests' (p.46). The lack of academic support for price
stabilisation is re£ected in the lack of support for international commodity
agreements (see e.g., Gilbert 1995) and for domestic price stabilisation
schemes. However, there remain those such as Timmer who are in favour of
domestic commodity price stabilisation schemes, particularly where the
commodity is signi¢cant in terms of GDP; which is more likely to be true for
developing than high-income countries. His arguments largely rest on a
postulated link between commodity price instability, macroeconomic instab-
ility and lower economic growth. There are numerous studies which ¢nd
evidence to support both sides of this argument. I believe that there is such a
link ^ though not for the oft-claimed reason of poor price signalling of
investment, but rather because of the di¤culties which governments have in
managing expenditure smoothing and the political economy problems of the
struggles over the distribution of resource rents. Sachs and Warner (1995)
¢nd a strong negative association between natural resource dependence and
growth. Reasons suggested for this adverse relationship include the Dutch-
Disease e¡ects of price booms in the export commodity. But the good
economic performances of initially resource-dependent economies such as
Botswana, Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia (and earlier the United States)
suggest that policies can modify or o¡set this impact.
If there is some social bene¢t to reducing the price uncertainty or price
variability
1 of commodities of signi¢cance within an economy, a number of
questions arise. Does this only apply to commodities that are signi¢cant
exports? Is it only relevant to commodities where the government is highly
dependent on the commodity for revenues (as with mineral or petroleum
exports, or such soft commodities as cocoa and co¡ee)? Or is it of
signi¢cance, as Timmer (1996) argues, when it is an important food
commodity such as rice in a low-income developing country? Is it the
reduction of price uncertainty or the reduction of price variability which is
important? One view is that reducing price uncertainty over de¢ned periods
by use of ¢nancial instruments (such as futures, options, swaps, etc.) has
bene¢ts in terms of increased productive e¤ciency, increased collateral value
of commodity stocks and superior budgetary control (Duncan and Gilbert
1995). Timmer (1996) argues that price variability in signi¢cant food crops,
such as rice in Indonesia, causes increased variability in other prices
1These are not the same. For example, use of futures contracts will reduce price
uncertainty over a limited period (say, one year) but, because commodity futures prices are
only slightly less variable than cash prices, does not reduce price variability much over
longer periods.
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allocating consumption and investment is thereby adversely a¡ected.
If expenditure smoothing, rather than reduction of price variability per
se, is the main concern (which also takes account of quantity variability), in
principle the adverse impact of commodity price and quantity £uctuations
on private and public expenditure can be managed through various
mechanisms ^ e.g., access to credit and deposit markets, to storage facilities,
or forms of insurance. While these instruments are generally available in
high-income countries (though not necessarily accessed because of
government crowding out of private-sector operations), in most developing
countries they have not been available, or available only on unfavourable
terms or in informal markets. There are two issues involved. One is the
unavailability of the facility because it has not been able to develop, or not
allowed to develop because of government restrictions. The other is the
inability of the individual agent or government to access the facility, often
because of lack of creditworthiness but also because of government
restrictions such as controls over capital movements which inhibit access to
international ¢nancial markets.
Liberalisation of commodity markets in developing and transition
countries has increasingly meant that price risks are borne by the private
sector rather than the government. This has created much greater interest in
the use of commodity price risk management and ¢nancing instruments in
developing countries. Because individual farmers do not generally have direct
access to these instruments, intermediaries must be developed and there have
been quite signi¢cant innovations in this area in recent years. For example,
in Africa a private bank, in Poland a private grain-processing company, and
in Mexico a government agency are o¡ering what are e¡ectively put options
to individual farmers, which allows them to lock in a price for their output
for the coming season. Farmer ¢nancing is also being enhanced by the
development of these facilities which provide security for bank loans for
working capital, as do warehouse-receipt facilities being developed in several
countries.
It has been argued (e.g., Dawe 1996) that expecting farmers to participate
in such activities following removal of public price stabilisation schemes is
unrealistic because of the high transaction costs. So far, the results are
promising, but time will tell. Other concerns arising from the prospect of
agricultural liberalisation, particularly Uruguay Round-agreed reductions of
price support programs in the European Union and the United States, are
that public grain stocks in these countries will be reduced, leading to lessened
cushioning of international price volatility and food shortages, and reduced
availability of food aid (see, for example, Islam and Thomas 1996). Several
points can be made in response to these concerns. First, public stocks crowd
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stocks will take the place of public stocks. Moreover, private stocks should
be more e¤cient than public stocking policies in terms of stabilising markets.
Further, given advances in transportation facilities and inventory-holding
practices, the optimal stock level may well be lower than in the past, just as
in other areas where inventories are held.
Second, more openness to trade by food-importing developing countries
should decrease their quantity risk exposure. Third, most low-income, food-
importing countries have policies which directly (taxes) or indirectly (over-
valued exchange rates) inhibit agricultural development. Better policies
would increase agricultural productivity and dampen production risks.
Finally, while the delivery of food aid has improved, in recognition of the
adverse impacts it can have on domestic food production and on
consumption patterns, the availability of food aid has been determined by
production behaviour under price supports in the donor countries, not by
demand in the recipient countries.
7. Conclusions
As far as the world food outlook is concerned, the recent upsurge in concern
seems poorly based. With population growth continuing to slow and the
most rapid phase of growth in food consumption now past for most of the
world's population, the rate of growth needed to meet the expected e¡ective
growth in demand is much lower than it has been for the past 40 years.
Those people concerned about recent declines in growth of grain yields
should remember that the world does not need yields to grow as fast as they
have done in the past, particularly for rice. It is therefore highly likely that
world prices of grains will continue to fall in real terms, though we have to
expect the occasional sharp increase as seen in the past year. But these will
not signal any long-term crisis in the world food situation. A challenge for
agricultural policies and for agricultural research is to adapt to the changing
dietary patterns resulting from the rapidly increasing incomes over much of
the developing world.
Other challenges are for developing and transition countries to set up
institutions and policies which will reduce the gap between experimental and
on-farm yields. Of most importance in this respect is the development of
property rights which provide farmers with more secure access to land and
pro¢ts. All countries face the challenge of putting in place institutions and
policies which will protect the agricultural resource base. In most cases, the
most appropriate management of soil, water and germplasm resources will
be achieved by internalisation of the external costs associated with their use.
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and water conservation, should lead to less unstable but higher production.
Production and price instability will continue, though whether the degree
of instability will be greater or less is impossible to say. Less interventionist
policies in major producers such as the European Union and the United
States may mean a lessened frequency of shocks, and even a modi¢cation of
their magnitude as the importance of private stockholding grows. However,
the growing importance in world markets of countries such as China, still
with a preoccupation with self-su¤ciency policies, is a potential source of
destabilisation of world food markets.
The management of commodity risks has entered a new era with the
global liberalisation of agricultural markets. This liberalisation has strong
support within economic research which judges international and domestic
e¡orts to stabilise prime commodity prices to be di¤cult, if not impossible,
to implement without subsidies, highly likely to be captured by special
interests, and of unproven net social bene¢t. Research is needed on the
question of the social value of reducing price uncertainty and/or price
variability and under what circumstances or for which commodities it is
likely to be of bene¢t.
These issues are likely to be of much greater signi¢cance to highly
commodity-dependent developing countries than to high-income countries
where the main pressure for price stabilisation stems from narrow producer
interests. With the private sector in developing countries facing substantially
greater commodity risk exposure following liberalisation, interest there is
focusing on the development of spot, forward and futures markets and
increasing accessibility of the sector to these markets, both domestically and
internationally.
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